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Introduction
Many standards-setting organizations (SSOs) ask holders of patents that are believed to be "essential" to the manufacture of standards-compliant products (sometimes termed "standard-essential patents" or "SEPs") to commit to making licenses available to an "unlimited" number of potential licensees on terms that are "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND), also known as "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) . 1 Many commentators have lamented that such SSOs provide little or nothing in the way of guidance as to what they mean by RAND royalties or licensing terms. Consequently, disputes over whether particular licensing terms are RAND may occur.
Competition authorities in particular have expressed concerns that, without clear guidance as to what RAND means, patent holders who have "essential" patents may have some degree of market power over implementers wanting to make standards-compliant products in the relevant technology markets, given the difficulty of collectively changing standards once they have been adopted, and given the desire by implementers to make standards-compliant products (in some markets, non-compliant products are not commercially viable).
A number of commentators have proposed various criteria that they say reflect what RAND "should" mean in order to attain some (often not clearly specified) goals or desiderata. Some SSOs are contemplating amending their intellectual property rights (IPR) policies to provide more guidance as to what they mean by RAND, but until recently none of those proposals has been accepted. Courts in the United States have experience in determining "reasonable royalty" patent infringement damages in patent cases. To our knowledge, no SSO has explicitly addressed the issue of whether "reasonable" in the context of RAND/FRAND should be interpreted as being synonymous with "reasonable" in the sense of patent infringement damages. Certain legal doctrines constrain "reasonable royalty" patent infringement damages (such as the proposition that U.S. courts can only award patent infringement damages on products "made, used, or sold" in the United States), and those doctrines do not appear to have any analog in the RAND standards-setting context. Also, "reasonable royalty" patent damages are only awarded if the patent holder shows that (some or all of) the accused products infringe at With respect to Judge Posner's grant of summary judgment on damages, the Federal Circuit reversed his "decision that Apple was not entitled to any damages for infringement of the '647 patent" 10 on the grounds that the jury had a duty to award "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty" under 35 U.S.C. 284. "Because no less than a reasonable royalty is required, the fact finder must determine what royalty is supported by the record." 11 "If a patentee's evidence fails to support its specific royalty estimate [as Judge Posner's "failure of proof" argument concluded], the fact finder is still required to determine what royalty is supported by the record."
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Finally:
Certainly, if the patentee's proof is weak, the court is free to award a low, perhaps nominal, royalty, as long as that royalty is supported by the record. … [But] a fact finder may award no damages only when the record supports a zero royalty award. … Of course, it seems unlikely that a willing licensor and willing licensee would agree to a zero royalty payment in a hypothetical negotiation, where both infringement and validity are assumed.
a. Judge Rader's Dissenting-in-part Opinion
In his dissenting-in-part opinion, 14 Judge Rader disagreed with the Federal Circuit's "affirmance of the district court's denial of Motorola's request for an injunction," saying:
Market analysts will no doubt observe that a 'hold out' (i.e., an unwilling licensee of a SEP seeking to avoid a license based on the value that the technological advance contributed to the prior art] is equally as likely and disruptive as a 'hold up' (i.e., a SEP owner demanding unjustified royalties based solely on value contributed by the standardization). These same complex factual questions regarding 'hold up' and 'hold out' are highly relevant to an injunction request. … The record in this case shows evidence that Apple may have been a hold out. … This evidence alone would create a dispute of material fact. 15 Judge Rader said, "Instead of a proper injunction analysis, the district court effectively considered Motorola's FRAND commitment as dispositive by itself." 16 "In my opinion, the court should have allowed Motorola to prove that Apple was an unwilling licensee, which would strongly support its injunction request." 17 He disagreed with the Federal Circuit majority's opinion that " [licensing] negotiations [between Apple and Motorola] have been ongoing," saying, "Motorola asserts otherwisethat Apple for years refused to negotiate while nevertheless infringing the '898 patent." He concluded, "Motorola should have had the opportunity to prove its case that Apple's alleged unwillingness to license or even negotiate supports a showing that money damages are inadequate and that it suffered irreparable harm. The district court refused to develop the facts necessary to apply eBay as it should have." 18 We believe that Chief Judge Rader had the better of this argument.
b. Judge Prost's Dissenting-in-part Opinion
Judge Prost also issued a separate dissenting-in-part opinion. 19 He also said that he "would affirm the grant of summary judgment [on the injunction issue] for all three [Apple] patents," 20 saying, "I agree with the district court that Apple's evidence fails to raise a genuine issue as to whether the allegedly infringing features are drivers of consumer demand for Motorola's products. As a result, Apple cannot show that Motorola's infringement has caused it irreparable harm." 21 This appears to us to conflate the "drivers of consumer demand" issue with the "irreparable harm" issue, though the two are conceptually distinct. The former typically arises in connection with the issue whether the "entire market value rule" applies, which strikes us as unrelated to the "irreparable harm" issue.
He also disagrees with "the majority's suggestion that an alleged infringer's refusal to negotiate a license justifies the issuance of an injunction after a finding of infringement," 22 saying that "an alleged infringer is fully entitled to challenge the validity of a FRAND-committed patent before agreeing to pay a license on that patent, and so should not necessarily be punished for less than eager negotiations." 23 He further said that "if a trial court believes that an infringer previously engaged in bad faith negotiations, it is entitled to increase the damages to account for any harm to the patentee as a result of that behavior." 24 He said that "none of these considerations alters the fact that monetary damages are likely adequate to compensate for a FRAND patentee's injuries. I see no reason, therefore, why a party's pre-litigation conduct in license negotiations should affect the availability of injunctive relief." 25 He also said, "I agree with the district court that under the facts here, Motorola cannot show either irreparable harm or inadequacy of damages. I would therefore affirm the district court's denial of Motorola's claim for injunctive relief for the '898 patent." 26 We agree with the majority and Judge Rader, not Judge Prost, on this point. His analysis did not take account of the prospect of what Judge Rader calls the "hold out" problem (what below we refer to as the "reverse hold-up" issue). For the FRAND system to work well, both sides have to engage in goodfaith negotiations over licenses. We acknowledge Judge Prost's point that an accused infringer has the right to challenge the asserted patent for invalidity and non-infringement, but that strikes us as a separate 18 question to whether the accused infringer is acting in good faith if it refuses even to discuss the licensing issue. The court's ability to "increase the damages" to account for bad-faith negotiating behavior, while helpful in discouraging such behavior, does not strike us as a complete substitute. In our view, he ignores the role of the availability of injunctive relief in bringing a reluctant licensee to the bargaining Motorola has a number of both U.S. and non-U.S. patents that it believes are "essential" to two industry standards: the H.264 standard relating to video compression promulgated by the IEEE, an SSO, 27 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Microsoft v. Motorola, Inc., Case No. C-10-1823JLR, U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle (April 25, 2013) (hereafter "Microsoft FFCL"), available at http://essentialpatentblog.com/2013/05/an-annotated-version-of-judge-robarts-microsoft-motorola-rand-royaltysetting-order/. References of the form "Microsoft FFCL, Para. NNN" are to the numbered paragraphs of this document. References of the form "Microsoft FFCL, p. NNN" are to the pages of this document that do not contain numbered paragraphs. 28 Google subsequently acquired the "Motorola Mobility" business of Motorola, including the relevant patent portfolio (of more than 17,000 patents), in May 2012 for $12.5 billion in a deal originally announced in August 2011. 36 In a deal announced in January 1014, Google subsequently sold the Motorola handset business to Lenovo for $2.91 billion, while retaining the patents it had acquired. The Robart decision raised a number of public policy issues. We discuss each of these separately below.
FedCir Ericsson Opinion
Judge Robart proposed, and Judge Holderman subsequently largely accepted, that in the absence of more guidance from SSOs as to how the RAND commitment is to be interpreted, it was reasonable to use a "modified" version of the 15 Georgia-Pacific factors used by U.S. courts in determining "reasonable 32 Microsoft FFCL, p. 3. 33 Microsoft FFCL, p. 4. Initially, there was some uncertainty as to whether Motorola intended to charge two separate royalties on products that complied with both standards, but Motorola subsequently made it clear that it intended to charge only a single royalty for such products. 34 royalty" patent damages.
38 Certain "modifications" were needed to take account of the fact that the patent holder had made a RAND commitment, and thus (for example) had given up the right (that it otherwise would have had) to refuse to license its technology at all and to keep its technology for its own exclusive use, 39 and had likewise given up the right to "discriminate" among licensees (e.g., by treating its competitors and non-competitors differently). 40 Judge Robart focused on what he termed the value of the technology "itself," not on the value added by being incorporated into the standard. 41 That is basically an ex ante approach. He examined the technology covered by each of the patents in suit (given his claim constructions) and concluded that they were not particularly valuable, 42 contributing only a "sliver" of the value of the standards. 43 In our view, this would not preclude firms that have patented technology that is inherently valuable, and that is incorporated into the standard because of its inherent value, from obtaining a much higher rate than Judge Robart awarded Motorola for its declared-essential-but-(in his view)-not-particularly-valuable patents.
Judge Robart said, "Microsoft contends that the economic value of patented technology isolated from the value derived from incorporation into the standard would be determined by calculating the incremental value of the technology compared to the alternatives that could have been written into the standard." 44 He said that this "approach suffers from several flaws," including "its lack of real-world relative to the next-best alternative, 51 saying that the "incremental value approach" is "required in the court's hypothetical negotiation paradigm," 52 while acknowledging that "approaches linking the value of a patent to its incremental contribution to a standard are hard to implement." 53 We have a more significant conceptual concern with the "incremental value" approach than simply its difficulty of implementation. Talking of "incremental value" raises the question: "incremental" relative to what? To a freely available public domain alternative? Or to an alternative patented technology? The two "incremental values" are often not the same. To illustrate the difference, suppose that three alternative technologies can be used to make a given product: an unpatented (public domain) technology PD that has a cost of $100/unit, a patented alternative A that has a cost of $80/unit, and another patented alternative B that has a cost of $78/unit. The "incremental value" of A relative to PD is $20/unit, and the "incremental value" of B relative to PD is $22/unit, but the "incremental value" of B relative to A is only $2/unit. In the polar extreme case where alternatives C and D both involve the same cost of $78/unit, the "incremental value" of each relative to the other is zero, despite the fact that both have an "incremental value" relative to the freely available PD of $22/unit.
As noted below, Judge Holderman in the Innovatio case rejected the defendants' expert's claim that a RAND royalty for patented SEP technology was limited to its incremental value of the patented technology relative to other patented alternatives, expressing concern that "even assuming that patent holders agreed to essentially give away their technology so that it will be adopted into the standard, such a low return for the patent holders would discourage future innovators from investing in new technology and from contributing their technology to future standards." He concluded that a patented alternative "will not drive down the royalty in the hypothetical negotiation by as much as technology in the public domain. In other words, the existence of patented alternatives does not provide as much reason to discount the value of Innovatio's patents as does the existence of alternatives in the public domain." 54 Motorola had originally offered the 2.25 percent rate because that was the rate that Motorola had previously offered for its SEPs relating to other standards (notably cellular-communications standards). The "reasoning" behind the offer seemed to be along the lines of, "Historically, we have successfully charged rates in the range of 2.25 percent of the selling price of the licensed products for our SEP portfolios in other areas. A standards-essential portfolio is thus worth 2.25 percent regardless of which standard is involved. We have SEPs relating to the H.264 and 802.11 standards. Therefore, we will ask for the same 2.25 percent royalty for our portfolios related to those standards as we have in the past successfully asked for our other standards-essential portfolios." Judge Robart conceded that Motorola's patent portfolio in cellular communications was "extremely strong" 55 and could command higher rates than he awarded for its H.264 and 802.11 patents. 58 For example, Judge Robart said, "Rewarding the SEP owner with any of the value of the standard itself would constitute hold-up value and be contrary to the purpose behind the RAND commitment." Microsoft FFCL, Para. 109 (emphasis added). He also said that "the RAND commitment exists so that SEP patent holders cannot demand more than they contribute." (Microsoft FFCL, Para. 104; emphasis added) Our points are (1) there are "gains from cooperation" associated with the standardization process, (2) by participating in the collaborative standards-setting process and making their technology available for use in making standards-compliant products, patent holders have "contribute[d]" more than simply the ex ante value of their technology, and (3) (in our view) patent holders should be able to get a "fair share" of the gains from cooperation associated with standardization without being accused of engaging in "hold-up." The difficulty, of course, is the "slippery slope" argument: how much of the "gains from cooperation" can patent holders receive before they shade over into inappropriate "hold-up"? Saying that the patent holder should be able to get a "fair share" of the gains is a notoriously difficult test to administer. A bright-line "innovators should receive none of the benefits" test avoids the prospect of hold-up, but at significant cost. 59 affecting the "comparability" of such licenses, but we question his decision to all but disregard non-RAND licenses and licenses entered into as a result of litigation. All licenses (in effect) are entered into under at least the shadow of the threat of litigation, and rates for non-FRAND licenses or licenses for nonSEPs nevertheless provide some useful information about "reasonable" royalties in the industry even if the circumstances are different, once the differences are taken into account.
Judge Robart rejected Microsoft's contention that the rates charged by other patent pools (there are two relevant patent pools: a relatively successful one for H.264 61 and a less-successful one for 802.11) 62 are determinative of the value of FRAND technology. 63 Judge Robart accepted Motorola's position that there are economic reasons to believe that firms that elect not to contribute their patents to the pool (given the rates the pool charges and the "sharing rule" that the pool uses to divide pool revenues among participants) are likely to be seen by their owners as more valuable than the patents that are contributed to the pool, so the patents not in the pool are self-selected not to be comparable to the patents that are contributed to the pool. 64 Yet in the end, he concluded that the pool rates are an "indicator" of the appropriate FRAND rates. 65 He relied on an internal Microsoft document to the effect that Microsoft got significant non-cash benefits (amounting to twice the royalties received) from its own pool participation activities 66 to "adjust" the pool rates upwards, effectively applying the same twofold-upward adjustment to Motorola/Google. 67 (Whether similar documents would exist in other cases or contexts is questionable.
Whether it is appropriate to extrapolate from Microsoft's document to a different licensor is likewise questionable. Microsoft's business model is very different from Motorola or Google's business model, suggesting that it is unlikely that Microsoft's "twice" ratio applies to Motorola or Google.)
Judge Robart agreed with Motorola that the appropriate methodology is to try to determine what would have been agreed to in bilateral negotiations, using a "modified" Georgia-Pacific framework ("modified" to account for the existence of the RAND commitment, which he said renders some of the traditional G-P factors irrelevant). 68 His reasoning appeared plausible, but it is based on his questionable fundamental premise that "the purpose" of RAND is to "ensure widespread adoption" of the standard. 69 One can argue that the overall goal of the system of seeking RAND commitments has at least two other purposes: (a) to adequately reward patent holders for their contributions to the standard, while making sure (b) that implementers are not blocked from implementing the standard by the unavailability of licenses to standards-essential technology. Judge Robart gives lip service to the former consideration 70 Moreover, FRAND commitments can be made and enforced in connection with unsuccessful standards (ones that never achieve widespread adoption) as well as successful ones, so interpreting the goal of FRAND as "ensur[ing] widespread adoption" seems to us to be incorrect, or at least overly simplistic. Standards are designed to promote interoperability and compatibility between products made by different suppliers. That goal can be achieved even if the standard does not achieve "widespread adoption." One goal of RAND is to ensure that implementers have access to the technology needed to make standards-compliant products, and again that goal has nothing to do with whether the standard achieves "widespread adoption."
Judge Robart emphasized the significance of royalty stacking to assessing RAND rates, 71 while disregarding real-world mechanisms (e.g., cross-licensing involving relatively small "balancing payments" rather than full two-way cash royalties; "Mexican standoff" situations in which two firms that have patents that they believe read on each other's products tacitly agree to leave the patent issue alone rather than explicitly engage in cross-licensing; or "repeat play"/reputation situations) that have evolved to address the "royalty stacking" issue. As noted below, Judge Davis in the Ericsson v. D-Link case took a very different approach to the "royalty stacking" issue than the one adopted by Judge Robart. We believe that Judge Davis had the better side of this issue.
Part of what may have affected Judge Robart's use of the 802.11 pool rates was Motorola's endorsement of the 802.11 pool rates at a time when it was considering joining the 802.11 pool.
72 (It ultimately did not join.) Another factor was an evaluation of Motorola's 802.11 patents by a consulting firm called InteCap. 73 Judge Robart concluded that the InteCap valuation "overstates [Motorola's 802.11 patent portfolio's] importance by at least a factor of 25"-his reasoning is based on his technical assessment of the importance Motorola's 802.11 patents-but he uses the "adjusted" InteCap numbers as one of the main inputs into his conclusions. 74 Judge Robart opined:
… a patent's royalty rate should be based on the importance of the patent to the standard and to the implementer's product. Under this analysis, this royalty rate would fluctuate little, if at all, based on the end selling price of the product. Accordingly, if 0.8 cents per unit is a reasonable royalty rate for a $200.00 Xbox, then it should be a reasonable royalty rate for an Xbox selling for $400.00 that uses the patented technology in the same manner.
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He did not explain his reasoning. In our view, his conclusion did not follow (as a matter of either logic or economics) from his premises. It is certainly possible that the value the licensee gets from incorporating the patented technology into its product varies with the product's features and characteristics, selling price, and/or profit margin, given the likelihood of economic synergies between different product features, even if different products "use[] the patented technology in the same manner." This is a significant aspect of his ruling, as it appears to rule out percentage-based royalties based on the 71 Microsoft FFCL, Paras. 456, 538. He said, "RAND is informed by two prevailing concerns: preventing stacking and eliminating hold-up. The court finds that, among these two goals, the anti-stacking principle is the primary constraint on the upper bound of RAND." Ibid. at Para. 538. 72 Microsoft FFCL, Paras. 472-487. 73 Microsoft FFCL, Paras. 591-612. 74 Microsoft FFCL, Paras. 610, 611, 614-619. 75 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 617.
selling price of the end-user product as being inconsistent with (his view of) FRAND. Since such royalties are common in the industry (though not in the two patent pools he considered) and thus are presumably "reasonable" in the "commercially reasonable" sense, he did not explain how he would deal with them. Instead, he adopted the two pools' approach of charging cents-per-unit royalties rather than percentage-based royalties, which in our experience are as commonly used as, if not more commonly used than, cents-per-unit royalties. He did not explain how his analysis would have changed if he had found some percentage-based licenses "comparable," nor how it might have changed had one of the two pools charged a percentage-based royalty.
Though Judge Robart gave lip service to the need to adequately compensate patent holders if their technology is incorporated into standards, 76 his ultimate conclusion (that the FRAND royalty rates for Motorola's essential patents are in the single-digit cents-per-unit royalty range) may not be sufficient to provide adequate compensation, and if extrapolated to other cases could discourage holders of valuable technology from participating in the standards-setting process.
It is hard to know how broadly to extrapolate Judge Robart's overall ruling, given his finding that Motorola's patents contributed only a "sliver" of the technology incorporated in the relevant standards. If his ruling is limited to such contexts, the economic harm to patent holders might not be too problematic. But if one were to extrapolate from the ratio of Motorola's original request (2.25 percent, or roughly $8.50/unit on a $400 Xbox) to the single-digit cents-per-unit royalties (totaling 3.972 cents/unit for the two portfolios) that he awarded, the threat to patent holders' interests could be significant. payments are to be made on RIM's aggregate sales regardless of the standards its products implement or the patents its products infringe." 92 We would agree that such apportionment would be difficult, and that the Motorola-RIM license was entered into in settlement of litigation (including an ITC Section 337 proceeding), but in our view that does not justify Judge Robart's giving short shrift to the relevance of, or weight given to, the RIM license. Motorola pointed out that RIM agreed to pay a (redacted) running royalty, including on its PlayBook tablet, which implements the 802.11 and H.264 standards but is not cellular compatible. Judge Robart concluded that "the PlayBook tablet is not a strong selling item for RIM," 93 though we fail to see the relevance of that fact if royalties were owed as he suggests. If sales were low, the total royalties paid would also be low, but that has nothing to do with the question whether the per-unit royalty was reasonable. He said that "the court cannot conclude that Motorola has established the RIM license agreement as a comparable royalty pursuant to [Georgia-Pacific] Factor 1." 94 He discussed a number of licenses entered into by Symbol, including a 6 percent license between Symbol and Proxim (subject to a royalty cap) 95 entered into after a jury had awarded Symbol 6 percent damages in a patent infringement damages suit. 96 He said that the witness who discussed the SymbolProxim license "did not know whether the jury had been instructed that there were RAND limitations on the royalties that could be awarded." 97 He said that "the Proxim agreement is not probative of the value of Motorola's 802.11 portfolio because the two patents licensed under the Proxim agreement … expired before Motorola even sent the October 21, 2010 demand letter to Microsoft." 98 We do not find this argument persuasive. First, it says nothing about the H.264 patent portfolio. Second, rates for other standards-essential portfolios from the same company provide at least some evidence of what industry participants believe is "reasonable." Third, the fact that the Symbol-Proxim license was structured as a percentage-based royalty (rather than a cents-per-unit royalty) seems to be more significant than Judge Robart appears to believe that it is.
Judge Robart also gave short shrift to two other Symbol licenses-a Symbol-HHP license and a Symbol-Terrabeam license-on the grounds that the payments under those licenses were "significantly less than the amount Motorola seeks in this case." 99 This does not strike us as particularly meaningful, as the total royalties are the product of the royalty rate times the royalty base, and one would expect that Microsoft's royalty base would be much higher than that of either HHP or Terrabeam. Moreover, given that commentators have concluded that Judge Robart awarded Motorola roughly 1/20th of 1 percent of the royalties that Motorola had been seeking from Microsoft, this dismissal of the relevance of the Symbol-HHP and Symbol-Terrabeam licenses seems to us inappropriate.
Judge Robart also discussed what he terms "Stacking Issues with the Rates Motorola Seeks." 100 He pointed out that if other firms with declared-essential patents had sought the level of royalties Motorola was seeking, the cumulative royalty stacks would be prohibitive, discouraging firms from implementing the standards. 101 He did not address the real-world solutions (cross-licenses with "balancing payments" less than the announced rates, "Mexican-standoff" situations, repeat play and reputation effects) that have evolved to mitigate the "royalty stacking" issue. Nor did he affirmatively justify his own rates on stacking grounds.
Microsoft had proposed two royalty rates charged by two patent pools-the MPEG-LA H.264 patent pool and the Via Licensing 802.11 patent pool-as "comparables." 102 111 He also concluded that the MPEG LA H.264 patent pool "contains significant and important technology vis-à-vis the H.264 standard," and said that this "alleviates the court's concern that patent pool rates may discourage SEP holders with valuable SEPs from participating." 112 We question this reasoning. His earlier acknowledgement that some holders of particularly valuable patents elect not to participate in the pool is not "alleviated" by the fact that some other holders of valuable patents do elect to participate, especially if they receive particularly significant non-monetary benefits from participating.
He noted that pool participants, especially those who also implement the standard, receive nonpecuniary benefits from participating in the pool. He relied on Microsoft estimates that it received twice as much in benefits as it received in royalties 113 and "concludes that Microsoft views membership in the MPEG LA H.264 patent pool as providing a value of at least twice as much as it receives in royalty rates." 114 He said, "In the absence of any other relevant evidence, the court thereby concludes that Google, like Microsoft, would also view membership in the MPEG LA H.264 patent pool as providing a value of twice the royalty rates it would receive as a licensor in the pool." 115 This is a non-sequitur. One cannot infer from one firm's action the value that another, differently situated firm receives (or would receive) from a similar course of conduct. The claim that the two firms "are similarly situated as sophisticated, substantial technology firms with vast arrays of technologically complex products" 116 ignores that fact that the two firms had very different business models, and in that regard are not "similarly situated" despite the fact that both are "sophisticated, substantial technology firms." Microsoft, unlike Google, sold both hardware products (the Xbox) and software, while Motorola was in the business of selling cellular handsets (which do not compete with the Xbox and likely have different profit margins than game consoles do), not software. Furthermore, Google gave away its Android software and made most of its money selling advertising, an entirely different business model than that followed by either Microsoft or Motorola.
Judge Robart provided a long algebraic footnote purporting to value a RAND royalty rate by comparing it to the pool rates and the value (above and beyond royalties received and paid) a pool participant gets from participating in the pool. 117 Both his algebra and his reasoning have significant conceptual problems, 118 but he nevertheless concluded that "the RAND rate in this case is three times the pool rate" 119 based on the Microsoft document he cited.
Judge Robart also pointed to the fact that Google, which acquired the Motorola patents after Motorola had sent its initial offer letters, was a participant in the HPEG LA H.264 patent pool. Microsoft also pointed to the royalties that "a third-party company, Marvell Semiconductor … pays for the intellectual property in its Wi-Fi chips. The court agrees that the Marvell rate provides an indicator for 802.11 RAND under [Georgia-Pacific] Factor 12 of the hypothetical negotiation because the experiences of Marvell, a third-party, tend to establish what is customary in the business of 117 Microsoft FFCL, Fn. 25, pp. 171-173. 118 The most serious conceptual problem is that he equated the value of participating in the pool with the value of not participating in the pool, which is true only for the "marginal" participant who is indifferent between joining and not joining. Ibid. Another major problem is that he assumed that the rate that Motorola "would have to pay for the pool's H.264 patent collection if it abstained from [joining] the pool" is "1.5 times the pool rate." Ibid. But pools charge the same rate to participants (those who contribute their patents to the pool) as they charge to nonparticipants. If anything, if Motorola elected not to join the pool, the pool would have included fewer patents, and one would expect the pool to charge the same amount or less if it had fewer patents to license. There is no logical or economic basis for his "1.5 times the pool rate" assumption. 119 Microsoft FFCL, Fn. 25, pp. 171-173. 120 Microsoft FFCL, Paras. 517-518. 121 Microsoft FFCL, Paras. 549, 557-558. 122 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 555. 123 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 556. 124 Echoing an earlier comment, Judge Robart quoted the same Marvell witness for the proposition that "the chips provide the same functionality in each host device regardless of the end cost of the device, so it is logical that the royalty rate be the same across all devices" 135 and that a royalty rate "based on the consumer end product … would also be impractical because when Marvell sells the chips it usually does not know their intended end use." 136 We do not agree that the conclusions follow from the premises. From an economic perspective, one relevant question is the value to the licensee of being able to use the patented technology, and there is no a priori reason why that value would be the same across different devices, even if different devices use identical chipsets. Judge Robart downplayed the fact that the Marvell license was at the chipset level, while Microsoft's business is at the consumer device (Xbox) and software (Windows) levels. We note that the economics of chipset manufacture and consumer device/software sales, and the value that different licensees receive from using patented technology in the 127 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 578. We are not convinced. As noted in the text below, Marvell is a chip manufacturer facing competition from other chip manufacturers, and its willingness to pay for a license is affected by that fact. Microsoft is not a chip manufacturer, but a supplier of consumer devices (the Xbox) and software (Windows). The prices of, and profit margins on, chipsets say nothing about the prices of, and profit margins on, consumer devices and (especially) software. 128 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 578. 129 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 579. 130 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 581. 131 A Microsoft adapter that adds 802.11 functionality to older Xboxes that did not come with that functionality built in (as newer Xboxes do) retails for $99 on Amazon. See http://www.amazon.com/Microsoft-Xbox-360-WirelessNetwork-Adapter/dp/B000B6MLV4/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1398399508&sr=8-2&keywords=xbox+360+wi+fi+adapter. We do not know how much Microsoft charges for such adapters; the "$60 to $70" in the text is an estimate. 132 Microsoft FFCL, Para 582. 133 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 583 (emphasis added). Microsoft is not a "semiconductor company." 134 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 588. 135 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 585. 136 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 585. different contexts, are very different. It might well be "impracticable" to charge a chipset manufacturer a royalty based on the selling price of the consumer products in which the chipsets are used, if for no other reason than because the chipset manufacturer does not have that information (it is collected by the chipset manufacturer's customers). But that has nothing to do with whether a royalty paid by the device manufacturer can use the device price (rather than the chipset price) as the royalty base. As Judge Robart noted, "[t]he profit margin on semiconductor chips is narrow," 137 while margins on devices and (especially) software can be significantly higher. It is as though Judge Robart believed that a RAND license could be evaluated at any stage in the "value chain," from chipset to handset to cellular system, with the RAND royalty being the same at all levels. That is true for fixed cents-per-royalty rates, but it does not follow, as a matter of either logic or economics, from either the "reasonable" or the "nondiscriminatory" aspect of RAND, the latter of which is generally understood to require only that similarly situated licensees be treated similarly.
Judge Robart also considered an analysis commissioned by Motorola from InteCap, Inc., an industry consulting firm.
138 InteCap "proposed a licensing model that segmented licensing markets and target companies" into three categories: chipset manufacturers; 802.11-dedicated products, such as routers and access points; and manufacturers of 802.11-enabled consumer products like laptops, PCs, and gaming consoles. 139 InteCap's proposed licensing model considered two factors: an "802.11 feature factor," Judge Robart considered three rate ranges for the 802.11 patent portfolio: one from the Via Licensing 802.11 pool, one from the ARM rate for the Marvell Wi-Fi chip, and an adjusted one from the 137 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 586. 138 Microsoft FFCL, Paras. 591-612. 139 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 592. 140 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 593. 141 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 595. As noted below in our discussion of Judge Davis' discussion of the "royaltystacking" issue, Judge Robart's analysis was not based on any evidence of an actual "royalty stack," but on the theoretical possibility of such a "stack" given the total number of potentially relevant patents, size of Motorola's patent portfolio, and royalties Motorola sought. 142 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 602. 143 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 610. 144 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 596. 145 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 598. 146 Microsoft FFCL, Paras. 601-602. 147 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 612.
InteCap analysis. He concluded that "these three indicators are very close to one another" when contrasted with Motorola's asking rate of 2.25 percent. 148 He said:
149
We disagree. This argument (which is based on the "reasonableness" aspect of RAND and not on the "non-discrimination" aspect) ignores the fact that the licensee receives more money (and probably earns a higher per-unit profit) on a $400 device than on a $200 device. It is a quite common industry practice (though, admittedly, not the practice followed by the two patent pools that Judge Robart considered) to charge percentage-based running royalties, so that the per-device royalty varies with the selling price of the licensed products. Judge Robart cited to nothing in the RAND policies of any of the SSOs, and nothing in Motorola's RAND commitments, suggesting that percentage-based royalties are not RAND. If SSOs intended to adopt a policy that a percentage-based running royalty was not RAND, one would expect that they would have done so explicitly. None has. If SSOs intended or understood that percentage-based royalty rates were inconsistent with RAND, one would expect them to have said so. None has. In our view, Judge Robart effectively reads into a RAND commitment or a RAND policy something that is not there. In particular, if a patent holder charges the same percentage-based running royalty to all "similarly situated" licensees, it is hard to see how that is "discriminatory" or not "reasonable."
Judge Robart concluded, "Accordingly, the court adopts the rate of 3.471 cents per unit as the rate Microsoft and Motorola would agree to for a license to Motorola's 802.11 SEP portfolio acting reasonably in a hypothetical negotiation in light of the RAND commitment. 
c. Damages Base Issues
Judge Robart did not address the question of the appropriate damages base. It is possible that he concluded that the appropriate royalty structure was a cents-per-unit royalty rate, so the royalty base would be the number of units sold and would not vary with the selling price of the infringing items. That said, his comment that "this [RAND] royalty rate would fluctuate little, if at all, based on the end selling price of the product" 154 effectively amounts to a rejection of a percentage-based running royalty based on the selling price of the end-user product, but is more consistent with the idea of a percentage-based 148 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 615. 149 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 617. 150 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 621. 151 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 622. 152 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 624. 153 Microsoft FFCL, Para. 627. 154 Microsoft FFCL, Para 617.
running royalty calculated on the selling price of a chipset (though he does not come out and explicitly endorse such an analysis).
Despite his ultimate decision to award a cents-per-unit royalty, Judge Holderman in the Innovatio case did address the question of the appropriate damages base. He concluded that the appropriate damages base was the price of the wireless chipset. He did so based on Innovatio's failure of proof:
Innovatio has provided the court no legally sound and factually credible method to apportion the price of the accused end-products to the value of only Innovatio's patented features. The court therefore has no choice but to look to the Manufacturers' proposed method of calculating a RAND royalty based on the price of a Wi-Fi chip. Accordingly, for purposes of this opinion the court will consider the price of a Wi-Fi chip to be the appropriate RAND royalty base.
155
Such a "failure of proof" argument is not an affirmative argument in favor of using the chipset price as the royalty base. That said, by choosing a fixed cents-per-unit royalty, the total damages did not depend directly on the prices of Wi-Fi chips, but instead on the per-unit rate and the number of chips sold.
In the Ericsson case, Ericsson had sought a $0.50/unit royalty, so the royalty base would have been the number of infringing units and not the selling price of the units sold. In Ericsson, Judge Davis rejected D-Link's argument that Ericsson had failed to comply with its RAND commitment by not initially licensing Intel, the chipmaker that supplied chipsets to D-Link, and by not suing Intel after Intel intervened in the case. Ericsson had committed to offer RAND licenses to "fully compliant" products. 156 Judge Davis said:
Ericsson's objective in licensing only fully compliant products was to isolate a particular level of the supply chain and to license companies at that level. … By licensing endproduct manufacturers, Ericsson believed it was indirectly licensing chip manufacturers such as Intel. … There is no IEEE rule preventing restricted RAND commitments, and other companies have adopted the same 'fully compliant' licensing policy as Ericsson. At least one commentator has pointed out this difference between the two opinions. 161 We believe that Judge Davis had the better of this argument. If one is concerned (as Judge Robart said he was) 162 with the question of whether cumulative royalties preclude or limit widespread adoption of some standard, presumably one wants to look at not merely theoretical possibilities, but also actual realities. Judge Robart did not discuss any real-world mechanisms other than patent pools-cross-licensing for relatively small "balancing payments," "Mexican standoff" situations, repeat play and reputation effects-that tend to alleviate the potential for royalty stacking. Many standards for which royalty-stacking concerns have been raised have been extremely successful, achieving widespread acceptance, suggesting that concerns that royalty stacking will deter or limit standard adoption are (as Judge Davis put it) more "theoretical" than actual.
Judge Robart downplayed the lack of evidence of an actual "royalty stack" by pointing out that his focus was on whether Motorola had complied with its RAND commitment; that the cumulative royalty stack depends not only on what Motorola was seeking, but also on the royalties that others charge for their patented portfolios; and that the issue of whether a particular patent holder complies with its RAND commitments is not affected by whether other patent holders comply with theirs. 163 While there is some truth in that argument, we believe that it has little to do with his main point about the prospect that "royalty stacking" can be affecting, or is likely to affect, adoption/implementation rates of a given standard.
Judge Robart noted that Motorola had addressed the issue of royalty stacking in a submission that it, Nokia, and Ericsson made to ETSI in 2006. 164 manufacturers, made a proposal to ETSI that they termed the "Minimal Change, Optimum Impact" (MCOI) proposal, urging that FRAND rates be evaluated consistently with what they termed two core principles, "aggregate reasonable terms" and "proportionality." They defined "aggregate reasonable terms" to mean that "in the aggregate the terms are objectively commercially reasonable taking into account the generally prevailing business conditions relevant for the standard and applicable product, patents owned by others for the specific technology, and the estimated value of the specific technology in relation to the necessary technologies of the product." 165 They defined "proportionality" to mean that "[c]ompensation under FRAND must reflect the patent owner's proportion of all essential patents. This is not simply a numeric equation but the compensation must, within reasonable bounds, reflect the contribution."
166
The MCOI proposal was a proposal for a general policy to be applied to all holders of SEPs, not just to the proponents. It amounted to a proposal for mutual forbearance by all SEP holders. The three proponents of the MCOI proposal "wore two hats," as patent holders and as handset suppliers. For patent holders, the MCOI proposal, if adopted, would have limited the royalties that its proponents would have received from others. But for handset suppliers, the MCOI proposal, if adopted, would have limited the royalties they would have to pay to others. Given that at the time (2006), the proponents were major handset manufacturers, one would expect that they believed that the benefits they would have received in the form of lower royalties they had to pay to others would have outweighed the costs to them in the form of lower royalties received from others. They never suggested that the proposal would apply unilaterally to their own patents while not applying to the patents of other SEP holders.
ETSI rejected the MCOI proposal (and, to our knowledge, no similar proposal has been accepted by any SSO) in part because of concerns expressed by DG Comp, the European competition authorities. Since Motorola (and the other proponents) never received the benefits of the mutual forbearance on royalties associated with the MCOI, we do not believe that it should pay the cost in the form of restrictions on the royalties it would have been able to receive had the MCOI proposal been adopted (as it was not). Judge Robart did not mention the fact that the proposal that he cited was rejected by ETSI, nor that it was put forth as a mutual forbearance proposal.
IV. Judge Holderman's Decision in In Re Innovatio
Innovatio had a portfolio of patents that it believed were essential to practice the 802.11 Wi-Fi standard. Rather than licensing the manufacturers of devices (e.g., Wi-Fi routers) that were used to run Wi-Fi networks, Innovatio sent out thousands of letters to businesses (e.g., hotels, coffee shops, and retailers) that operated Wi-Fi networks on their premises, offering to license at the "Network Operator" level. Many refused, and Innovatio filed a number of lawsuits alleging infringement at the Network Operator level. Those suits were consolidated in a multidistrict litigation proceeding before Judge Holderman in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. A number of Wi-Fi device manufacturers-Cisco, Motorola, HP, Sonic Wall, and Netgear (the "Manufacturers")-intervened in the consolidated suits, seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity and non-infringement.
The parties agreed to litigate the issue of a RAND royalty for licenses to device manufacturers in a bench trial to the court prior to rulings on the claim construction, validity, and infringement issues. 167 Judge Holderman issued an 89-page "Memorandum Opinion, Findings, Conclusions, and Order" on the FRAND issue in October 2013. In contrast to Judge Robart, who found that Motorola's patents were only of minimal value to the two standards he considered, Judge Holderman found that Innovatio's patents were of "moderate to high" importance to the 802.11 standard. 168 He endorsed many aspects of Judge Robart's analysis, but disagreed with Judge Robart on a couple of key issues. He said that "unlike Judge Robart, the court will not adjust the RAND rate in light of pre-litigation uncertainty about the essentiality of a given patent." 169 We believe that Judge Holderman's position on this point is correct. If RAND royalties will only be awarded after the patent holder prevails on its liability case, the rates should reflect the rates appropriate for a proven-valid-and-infringed patent, and there should be no "discount" for uncertainty connected with disputed issues of validity or infringement. (That is not to say that RAND licenses cannot be entered into for "untested" patents; there is no requirement that RAND licenses be restricted to provenvalid-and-infringed patents.)
Judge Holderman cited repeatedly to Judge Robart's Microsoft decision. He largely accepted Judge Robart's "modified Georgia-Pacific" approach. 170 Like Judge Robart's treatment of Motorola's proposed "comparable" licenses, Judge Holderman largely dismissed the "comparable" licenses that Innovatio pointed to, concluding that "as a factual matter none of [Innovatio's licensing expert's] proposed licenses are in fact appropriate for a comparative analysis in the RAND context. … They are therefore not reliable benchmarks by which Innovatio may apportion the value of the patented features in the claims of its patent portfolio from the value of wireless connectivity in general."
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As noted above, with respect to the relevance of proposed non-infringing alternatives that are themselves patented, Judge Holderman said:
The court agrees that it is implausible that in the real world, patent holders would accept effectively nothing to license their technology. Moreover, even assuming that patent holders agreed to essentially give away their technology so that it will be adopted into the standard, such a low return for the patent holders would discourage future innovators from investing in new technology and from contributing their technology to future standards. … Accordingly, the court will consider patented alternatives, but will recognize that they will not drive down the royalty in the hypothetical negotiation by as much as technology in the public domain. In other words, the existence of patented alternatives does not provide as much reason to discount the value of Innovatio's patents as does the existence of alternatives in the public domain. 172 167 Innovatio MOFCO, pp. 1-2. 168 Innovatio MOFCO, p. 87. 169 Innovatio MOFCO, p. 13. 170 Innovatio MOFCO, pp. 7-13. 171 Innovatio MOFCO, p. 34. 172 Innovatio MOFCO, p. 37.
In this regard, he accepted the trial testimony of one of the authors (Teece).
With respect to proposed non-infringing alternatives, Judge Holderman differentiated between those that were and were not considered by the IEEE at the time the standard was adopted. With respect to the latter, he said:
If a proposed alternative had not even been presented to the IEEE, however, it is implausible to believe that asserting such a technology as a plausible alternative would be an effective negotiating point [in the hypothetical negotiation], as it is exceedingly unlikely that the IEEE would adopt such an alternative. … Rather than second-guessing the technical expertise of the many engineers and technicians who participated in the development of the 802.11 standard, the court will assume that technology that did not even merit a mention by the IEEE in its deliberations about the standard was not likely to have been a serious contender for adoption into the standard. Accordingly, the court will only consider technology that was considered by the standard-setting body when determining whether there are alternatives to the patented technology that could have been adopted into the standard.
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With respect to the possibility of "reverse hold-up"-the prospect that a patent holder will be inadequately compensated for others' use of its patented technology, especially in circumstances involving widespread infringement-Judge Holderman said:
The court is not persuaded that the concern of reverse hold-up is relevant in this case, as there is no evidence before the court that Innovatio or its predecessors ever offered the Manufacturers a license, or that such an offer was rejected on the ground that it was not fair or reasonable. Moreover, the court is not persuaded that reverse hold-up is a significant concern in general, as it is not unique to standard-essential patents. 174 We find this explanation puzzling and unpersuasive. To our knowledge, no one has ever suggested that the prospect of reverse hold-up is "unique to standard-essential patents"; reverse hold-up can arise in both SEP and non-SEP contexts. That Innovatio did not offer the manufacturers a license is not surprising given that Innovatio's strategy was to license at the end-user (Network Operator) level, "downstream" from the manufacturers, not at the manufacturer level. Its "failure" to offer the manufacturers a license has nothing to do with whether others use Innovatio's patents without paying adequate compensation, which is the core of the "reverse hold-up" scenario.
In Innovatio, the manufacturer defendants argued that the appropriate royalty/damages base should be the cellular chipset that was incorporated into the devices that they sold, arguing that the chipset provided "the guts" of Wi-Fi functionality. Innovatio argued that the case law focused on the smallest saleable patent-practicing device and that "patent practicing" should be interpreted to mean satisfying all of the elements of the patent claims. Innovatio noted that a number of the claims of the patents in suit were not satisfied by the chipset, as some of the claims were "systems" claims requiring much more than just a chipset. (Though a stand-alone chipset would not infringe such claims directly, it might be found to infringe under the "contributory infringement" or "inducement to infringe" theories when used in its ordinary and intended purpose, namely built into a device that was used as part of a cellular system.) The manufacturer defendants argued that some of the earlier cases had spoken not of "patent practicing" products, but of whether the accused products embodied the "inventive steps" of the patent, and argued that all of the essential innovative features were to be found in the chipset. 175 Following a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases dating back to 1884, Judge Holderman said that the patent holder had an obligation to apportion the selling price of the infringing products as between the patented feature and unpatented features. 176 He asked whether Innovatio had succeeded in showing that it had properly apportioned the revenues/profits that the manufacturer defendants had earned from making and selling infringing products as between the patented technology and non-patented features. Innovatio's experts' apportionment testimony had two parts: by (1) Mr. Christopher Bergey, "a former Vice President of Broadcom," as to what he termed a "Wi-Fi Feature Factor" for various classes of end-user devices, ranging from 10 percent for laptops to 95 percent for access points, wireless radio modules and dongles; and (2) Mr. Larry Evans, a patent licensing expert, on royalty rates from what he identified as "comparable" licenses.
Judge Holderman dismissed Mr. Bergey's testimony as "not based on an established method of analysis, but is instead speculative and subjective." 177 He concluded that Mr. Bergey's testimony "lacked a credible methodology," 178 was "based merely on speculation," 179 was "based on his own subjective impressions," 180 and was "not credible." 181 Judge Holderman also concluded that the "comparable" licenses identified by Mr. Evans were not good "comparables," finding that "none of Innovatio's proposed comparable licenses are appropriate for determining a royalty in the RAND licensing context." 182 Some of the licenses considered by Mr. Evans had been considered and rejected by Judge Robart. Judge Holderman rejected licenses entered into by Symbol with Proxim and Terrabeam on the grounds that "they were both adopted under the duress of litigation …" 183 and following "a jury verdict awarding Symbol $22.9 million for Proxim's infringement," 184 citing the "coercive effect of a $22.9 [sic] jury verdict in favor of Symbol …" 185 Judge
Holderman also disregarded a Qualcomm-Netgear license because (a) Qualcomm had far more patents than the Innovatio patents in dispute and (b) the Qualcomm patents related to different standards than the 802.11 Wi-Fi standard at issue. Judge Holderman concluded that Innovatio expert Dr. Nettleton's effort to appeal to the Qualcomm-Netgear license was "not credible" given Dr. Nettleton's admissions at his deposition that he had not studied the Qualcomm patents.
Judge Holderman concluded, "Innovatio has provided the court no legally sound and factually credible method to apportion the price of the accused end-products to the value of only Innovatio's patented features. In light of that failure of proof, the court has no choice based on the record but to calculate a royalty based on the Wi-Fi chip." 187 In other words, the court's decision to use the selling price/profitability of the Wi-Fi chip as the basis for its royalty calculations was based on Innovatio's "failure of proof," which is not an affirmative endorsement that the chipset is the appropriate damages base but merely a recognition of Innovatio's "failure of proof."
With respect to the rates in the Via Licensing 802.11 patent pool, Judge Holderman identified "several problems with the use of the Via pool as an indicator of a RAND rate in this case," 188 pointing to the relatively small number of licensors and licensees the Via pool had attracted (saying that "the court finds it more plausible … that the prices are too low to give patent holders a reasonable return on their technology"). 189 He also cited Judge Robart's Microsoft opinion that "the purpose of the RAND commitment is to achieve widespread adoption of the standard. It stands to reason then that the less a patent pool achieves widespread adoption of the standard, the less relevant the pool becomes as an indicator of a RAND royalty rate." 190 Judge Holderman also acknowledged the self-selection nature of patent pools, namely that the combination of the (a) rates charged by the pool and (b) "sharing rule" by which the pool proceeds are divided among patent-holder participants implies that holders of especially valuable patents are more likely to elect not to participate in the pool. Judge Holderman noted:
Using the Via patent pool, which the evidence shows did not include high-value patents, to calculate a rate for low-value patents may be appropriate. By contrast [to Judge Robart's analysis of Motorola's patents] this court has determined that Innovatio's patent portfolio is of moderate to moderate-high importance to the 802.11 standard. In that context, the Via patent pool is not an appropriate comparable license.
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The manufacturer defendants' economic expert, Dr. Leonard, also pointed to "four licenses for 802.11 technology that did not arise in the context of a RAND obligation." 192 Judge Holderman said, "The court does not take a position of whether non-RAND licenses can ever be useful in determining a RAND rate," 193 -largely ignored it, and tacitly assumed that the chip manufacturers' profits are exogenously set (and fixed at their historical levels). If chip manufacturers were required to pay royalties, they could have sought to pass them on in the form of higher chip prices, 213 especially given the "patent exhaustion" doctrine that a license "upstream" in the value chain precludes the patent holder from seeking further royalties from those "downstream" from its licensees. The alternative was not solely to "exit the chip-making business."
Judge Holderman's reasoning also ignored the price-depressing effect of widespread infringement.
214 Some chipset manufacturers make infringing chipsets without taking a license or paying 208 Innovatio bought its patents from Broadcom; Broadcom retained a paid-up license under the patents, and the fact that it did so presumably affected (reduced) the price Innovatio paid for the patents (Innovatio MOFCO, pp. 58-59). Broadcom did not "pa[y] a royalty for the use of Innovatio's technology" in the sense of paying a running out-of-pocket royalty, which traditional microeconomic theory suggests is the only kind that would affect its goingforward chipset pricing. (A lump-sum offset against the purchase price paid by Innovatio does not involve marginal cost.) The manufacturer defendants did not introduce evidence of royalties that may have been paid by Intel or Atheros, but we think it is likely that their licenses were cross-licenses entered into with Broadcom (when Broadcom owned the patents that it later sold to Innovatio) that did not involve any running royalties (though it is possible that they may have involved lump-sum payments).
Broadcom (or another licensed manufacturer) clearly could choose to "exert downward price pressure" should another chip manufacturer seek to raise its chip prices in response to royalties, but the relevant question is whether it would be in its economic interest to do so, or whether it would take advantage of others' proposed higher royalties, prices of and profit margins on chipsets will be reduced relative to what they would have been had royalties been paid, and capping royalties at the infringer's depressed profit margins would not adequately compensate the patent holder.
More significantly, where the license would have been from Innovatio to the device manufacturers, 215 rather than from Innovatio to the chipset manufacturers, the chipset manufacturers' prices and profits are almost entirely irrelevant to the benefits that the device manufacturers received from using the patented technology. There is no logical or economic connection between chipset profit margins and the value to a device manufacturer of being able to use the patented technology. There would only be a connection if all of the value of being able to use the patented technology, at all levels in the "value chain," had been captured at the chipset level. Chipset prices and profits are driven by competition at the chipset level, which is driven by such factors as Moore's Law. As Judge Holderman noted, chipset prices have fallen steadily and dramatically over time, from an average of $37/chip in 1997 to $3.05/chip in 2013. 216 We think that it is highly unlikely that the value to device manufacturers of being able to use Innovatio's (or others') patented cellular technology has fallen so dramatically over time.
Judge Holderman asserted:
Considering the profit of the chip manufacturer on the chip, rather than the profit margins of the Manufacturers on the accused products, is appropriate because a RAND licensor such as Innovatio cannot discriminate between licensees on the basis of their position in the market. Thus, the RAND rate that the court determines here should be the same RAND rate that Innovatio could charge to chip manufacturers on its patent portfolio.
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We disagree. Judge Holderman provided no basis for this interpretation of the "non-discrimination" aspect of RAND. A patent holder that has made a RAND commitment has an obligation to make an "unlimited" number of licenses available, but that does not mean that the patent holder is obliged to chip prices to increase its own chip prices and thus its per-chip profits. Judge Holderman's tacit implication that a licensee would find it more profitable to do the former rather than the latter is unsubstantiated. Moreover, Judge Holderman did not estimate the effect of any such hypothesized "downward price pressure." Infra-marginal suppliers routinely take advantage of a "pricing umbrella" by keeping their prices higher rather than undercutting their higher-cost rivals. And if other chip manufacturers did elect to exit the chip market in the face of having to pay Innovatio royalties, that would reduce supply and increase prices. Moreover, Judge Holderman's analysis (and in particular his analysis of the "royalty stacking" issue) was not based on Innovatio's patents alone, but on the cumulative effect of potential royalties that might paid to all holders of essential patents. The fact that some chip manufacturers were licensed under the Innovatio patents (in the form of paid-up lump-sum licenses) says nothing about whether they were licensed under the patents of other SEP holders. Judge Holderman's assertion "that there is no evidence of widespread infringement of 802.11 standardessential patents" focused only on whether three chip manufacturers were licensed under Innovatio's patents; he did not investigate whether they (or other chip manufacturers) were licensed under others' "802.11 standard-essential patents." 215 It is worth recalling that Innovatio originally sought to license (and then sued), not the manufacturers, but the network operators who used unlicensed devices in their systems. It was only after the manufacturers intervened that the case morphed into a dispute between Innovatio and the manufacturers, none of whom was a chipset manufacturer. No chip manufacturer was ever a party to, or an intervenor in, any of the suits involved in the Innovatio case. 216 Innovatio MOFCO, p. 81. 217 Innovatio MOFCO, p. 74 (emphasis added).
license at all levels of the value chain. To our knowledge, no SSO has a policy that states that. Innovatio has not licensed its patents at the chipset level, 218 and the Innovatio manufacturer defendants (who intervened in the suits Innovatio originally brought against retailers and others "Network Operators" who were operating Wi-Fi networks at their premises) were not chipset manufacturers. Those who have studied the "non-discrimination" aspect of the RAND commitment have concluded that it does not require that all licensees receive the same license terms, but merely that "similarly situated" licensees should be treated similarly. Chipset manufacturers and device manufacturers are not "similarly situated." The products they sell, the prices they sell for, and their profit margins are all very different.
Similarly, Judge Holderman said that "the court finds that none of Innovatio's proposed comparable licenses are appropriate for determining a royalty rate in the RAND licensing context. Accordingly, there is no credible basis in the record for calculating a RAND royalty on the basis of endproduct prices."
219 That statement makes no economic sense. The fact that he rejected Innovatio's proposed comparable licenses does not imply that one cannot use end-product prices (or profit margins) rather than chipset prices (or profit margins). All it means is that the proposed comparables were rejected. That is not an affirmative basis for using chipset prices/profit margins rather than device prices/profit margins.
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Some of Judge Holderman's criticisms of Mr. Bergey's analysis seem unpersuasive. For example, Mr. Bergey identified "Wi-Fi Feature Factors" for categories of products. Judge Holderman pointed out (correctly) that different products within the various product categories differed, so that applying a single "Feature Factor" to all products in the category would inherently overstate the importance of Innovatio's patents to some products in the category and understate it for other products. 221 The question is whether that observation undercuts the use of a "Feature Factor" approach applied to a relatively small number of product categories. Inherently, such analysis would have to be somewhat simplified, as using a single "Factor" to apply to a group of similar products, which can differ among themselves, does inherently overestimate the factor applicable to some products in the group and underestimate the factor applicable to others. The real concern is whether such an approach biases the result (in a statistical sense) one way or another to either over-or underestimate damages. Judge Holderman's discussion did not demonstrate the existence of any statistical bias. The real question is whether the approach of grouping products into categories and estimating an average for each category biases the overall result upwards or downwards. There is no a priori reason to believe that it does.
218 Broadcom sold a portfolio of patents to Innovatio and retained a paid-up license. Broadcom is a chipset manufacturer. Before selling the patents, Broadcom had also cross-licensed a number of other chipset manufacturers, notably Intel and Atheros. Those were licenses that Innovatio inherited, not licenses that Innovatio entered into. Innovatio's licensing program was at the end-user "Network Operator" level, not at the device or chipset level. 219 Innovatio MOFCO, p. 59. 220 Judge Holderman used data on chipset prices and profit margins, rather than data from "comparable" licenses, to perform his calculations of RAND royalties. He presumably could have used data on device prices and profit margins to perform similar calculations, though that data was not reported in his opinion (and it is not clear whether Innovatio introduced such data into the record). 221 Innovatio MOFCO, p. 29 (discussing the fact that access points differed in a number of ways, such as whether they had mounting brackets, Ethernet connections, and software, while Mr. Bergey assigned the same "Feature Factor" of 95 percent to all of them).
The Innovatio manufacturer defendants' expert proposed that Judge Holderman calculate damages based on the weighted average profit margins of chipsets over the damages period. Because chipset prices fell significantly over time and chipset volumes increased significantly over time, the weighted average selling price and profit margin fell significantly over time. Judge Holderman instead used a simple (non-weighted) average selling price and profit margin, 222 saying that "the parties to a hypothetical negotiation in 1997 would likely settle on approximately that number when determining the appropriate chip price to consider when setting a RAND rate." 223 He said:
If, as Judge Davis implies, licensing at the device level is sufficient to satisfy a RAND commitment, then what would appear to be relevant are device level prices and profits. 233 
VI. Federal Circuit Opinion in Ericsson v. D-Link
On appeal from Judge Davis' decision, the Federal Circuit for the first time spoke out on FRAND issues. 234 It vacated the district court's damages award and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On the Entire Market Value Rule ("EMVR"), it said: "While a number of our cases have referred to the concept of an entire market value 'rule,' the legal standard actually has two parts, which are different in character. There is one substantive legal rule, and there is a separate evidentiary principle; the latter assisting in reliably implementing the rule when-in a case involving a percent royalty-the jury is asked to choose a royalty base as the starting point for calculating a reasonable royalty." 235 
"{[T]he
governing rule is that the ultimate combination of royalty base and royalty rate must reflect the value attributable to the infringing features of the product, and no more." 236 "When the accused infringing products have both patented and unpatented features, measuring this value requires a determination of the value added by such features. ,,, Logically, an economist could do this in various ways-by careful selection of the royalty base to reflect the value added by the patented feature, where that differentiation is possible; by adjustment of the royalty rate so as to discount the value of a product's non-patented features; or by a combination thereof. The essential requirement is that the ultimate reasonable royalty award must be based on the incremental value that the patented invention adds to the end product." 237 "Our cases have added to that governing legal rule an important evidentiary principle. The point of the evidentiary principle is to help our jury system reliably implement the substantive statutory requirement of apportionment of royalty damages to the invention's value. The principle, applicable specifically to the choice of a royalty base, is that, where a multi-component product is at issue and the patented feature is not the item which imbues the combination of other features with value, care must be taken to avoid misleading the jury by placing undue emphasis on the value of the entire product. It is not that an appropriately apportioned royalty award could never be fashioned by starting with the entire market value of a multi-component product-by, for instance, dramatically reducing the royalty rate to be applied in those cases-it is that reliance on the entire market value might mislead the jury, who may be less equipped to understand the extent to which the royalty rate would need to do the work in such instances." 238 the hearsay rule is to assist the jury in coming to an appropriate decision and reject unreliable evidence, but that provides no guidance as to the metes and bounds of the hearsay rule, or how it is to be applied in practice. Similarly, it is one thing to say that "care must be taken to avoid misleading the jury," but that is not in any meaningful sense an "evidentiary principle," as it provides no guidance as to what evidence is and is not admissible. Saying "care must be taken" is all well and good, but it is quite another thing to explain what "evidentiary principle" is needed and/or desirable to achieve that result. Nor is there any explanation why an "evidentiary principle" is needed, as contrasted (for example) with a jury instruction admonishing the jury of the need to properly apportion. After all, one would expect that the defendant in patent infringement damages cases would have a strong incentive to urge the jury not to be "misled" into awarding excessive damages.
With respect to the Georgia-Pacific factors, the FedCir noted, "In a case involving RANDencumbered patents, many of the Georgia-Pacific factors simply are not relevant; many are even contrary to RAND principles."
239 "In this case, the district court erred by instructing the jury on multiple Georgia-there is no good reason why patent holders should not obtain a "fair share" of those gains from trade in the form of higher royalties than the technology would command in a different (non-standardization) context. (For the reasons given at length above, we also disagree that an "incremental value" approach is appropriate, at least when "incremental value" is measured relative to other patented alternatives.)
The FedCir upheld Judge Davis' decision not to issue an instruction on the issue of royalty stacking.
245 "A jury, moreover, need not be instructed regarding royalty stacking unless there is actual evidence of stacking. The mere fact that thousands of patents are declared to be essential to a standard does not mean that a standard-complaint company will necessarily have to pay a royalty to each SEP holder."
246
The Fed Cir also approved the use of various licenses as "comparables," despite the fact that, as the FedCir noted, "licenses are generally negotiated without consideration of the EMVR," 247 noting, "Making real-world relevant licenses inadmissible on the grounds D-Link urges would often make it impossible for a patentee to resort to market-based evidence. Such evidence is relevant and reliable, however, where the damages testimony regarding those licenses takes into account the very types of apportionment principles contemplated in Garretson. In short, where expert testimony explains to the jury the need to discount reliance on a given license to account only for the value attributed to the licensed technology, as it did here, the mere fact that licenses predicated on the value of a multi-component product are referenced in that analysis … is not reversible error." In this paper, we have discussed the implications of these rulings from the perspective of economics and public policy. The courts have generally relied on modified versions of the criteria used in determining "reasonable royalty" patent infringement damages. Whereas some of these proposed modifications are sensible in our view, others are inconsistent with generally accepted economic principles and are likely to have an adverse effect on incentives to innovate. Some key economic takeaways (not all, unfortunately, acknowledged by the courts) are the following:
• There is no such thing as "the value of the patent itself" independent of context. The "same" patent can command different royalties (and possibly different royalty structures) in different contexts and for different applications.
• By participating in the collaborative standards-setting process and making their technology available for use in making standards-compliant products, patent holders have contributed more than simply the ex ante value of their technology. Patent holders should be entitled to seek a "fair share" of the gains associated with standardization without being accused of engaging in "hold- • A policy that restricts holders of SEPs to only receiving the "inherent value" of their technology and that gives them none of the value associated with the standardization process would be inherently biased against innovators and in favor of implementers.
• There is no basis for concluding that the "incremental value approach" is part of what SSOs consider F/RAND.
• While F/RAND requires that similarly situated licensees be treated similarly, it does not follow that the F/RAND royalty must be the same at all levels of the value chain. In other words, F/RAND royalties may be percentage-based and vary with the selling price of the licensed products.
